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ISSN 0342 - 0787Abstract
The issue at stake at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea was a new international distribution of ocean wealth along
the lines of the so-called New International Economic Order. The best
example of interventionism on the international mineral markets is the
Convention's regime to govern seabed mining.
This paper presents empirical estimates in an attempt to identify net
winners and net losers resulting from ocean mining both under the Con-
vention and under open access, and to contrast these outcomes with
widely held beliefs concerning the distributional impact of seabed
mining. Furthermore, it discusses the desirability and feasibility of
loser compensation by the Seabed Authority.- I -
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I. Introduction
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
will probably be remembered as one of the longest diplomatic battles
between DCs and LDCs fought in the twentieth Century. The issue at
stake was nothing less than a redistribution of ocean wealth, i. e. of
future income flows arising "from the different uses of the world's ma-
rine resources. On the basis of majority voting (one country, one
vote), UNCLOS produced a Convention which, should it pass ratifica-
tion, can be regarded as a major step of the international Community
towards the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO).
It is the Convention's regime to govern deep-sea mining that best em-
bodies the NIEO-spirit, apparently on the ground that the "common
heritage of mankind" (the polymetallic nodules) should be managed by
an international bureaucratic body rather than by market forces, in or-
der to guarantee a "just" distribution of the potential economic rent
among the countries of the world. Although it can be hardly denied
that the pressure on metal prices resulting from minerals production
from the ocean bed could impose an additional bürden on sonne mineral-
exporting LDCs already facing serious balance of payments problems, it
is not at all clear a priori to whom the potential net gains from deep-
sea mining will accrue, nor which of the land-based producers will suf-
fer the highest losses. Furthermore, it is neither obvious whether the
creation of another international bureaucracy could assist the world in
coping with seabed mining without totally dissipating the mineral rents
involved.
This paper intends to give an answer to these questions at a time when
an increasing number of countries is pushing for a review of the Con-
vention while others are already pleading for similar regimes to govern
future resource utilization in Antarctica and outer space. In the next
section direct income effects from seabed mining are identified, the
quantitative estimates of which are presented in Section III. The last
section deals with the central policy issues in seabed mining: First,
whether a redistribution of gains from deep-sea mining is necessary,
and second, whether the Seabed Authority could contribute to compen-
sate the losers in case it should be desirable.- 2 -
II. The Potential Income Effects of Metals Production From the Ocean
Bed: Some General Considerations
Additional minerals supply from the ocean bed are expected to have es-
sentially two major direct income effects. One of these is the short-run
impact of a supply-curve shift to the right on prices, land-based pro-
duction and consumption as reflected by changes in the level and dis-
tribution of producer and consumer surpluses. The other income effect
is the revenue of the Seabed Authority generated by fees and royalties
paid by firms receiving mining contracts . Indirect income effects re-
lated to deep-sea mining should also be considered, though unfortunate-
ly, they are extremely difficult to identify and more difficult still to
measure. At any rate, they can be thought of as the effects on other
sectors of the economy (including the government) through interindus-
try linkages, technological externalities (spillover) and the savings re-
sulting from lower Strategie inventory holdings by Western DCs. In this
2
paper, however, the analysis will focus on direct effects only .
1. The Impact of Seabed Mining on Producer and Consumer Surpluses
Changes in producer and consumer surpluses following the beginning of
deep-sea mining can be easily demonstrated applying elementary micro-
economic market theory to the minerals markets in question. Unfortu-
nately, the two most important metals to be recovered from manganese
nodules, cobalt and nickel, cannot be said to be supplied under compe-
titive conditions [Rafati, a; b], However, if several international con-
sortia bring their seabed mining operations onstream simultaneously, the
cobalt and nickel markets will automatically become more competitive. In
fact, the threat alone that they could start production any time should
already have a considerable impact on the dominant land-based produ-
cer, considering the long-term decisions typically taken in this indus-
try.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the "Enterprise", the Authority's
arm envisaged to actively engage in seabed mining, will not operate
during the period studied.
2
For an attempt to quantify some of the indirect income effects of
deep-sea mining see Dick [1982].- 3 -
Figure 1 shows the long-term supply and demand curves, for example,
on the world manganese market. The market is in equilibrium at the
outset if the land-based producers seil the quantity q0 for the price
p„. The additional supply from the ocean bed shifts the supply curve
SS
! to the right into the position S*S*\ Now the price falls to pv Op1
being the cost of seabed mining, and the quantity supplied by land-
* based producers is reduced ffom q„ to qT ; the amount qn - q, is being
replaced by cheaper manganese from deep-sea mining. Total manganese
production from the ocean bed amounts to q1 - qT . The resulting gain
in consumers' surplus is represented by the area pnp..da and the loss
in producers' surplus by pftp..ba; the difference between these two are-
1 as, the triangle bda, is the net gain accruing to market participants .
Such an outcome, however, heavily depends on the cost of seabed min-
ing, which is very unlikely to be so much lower than the cost of land-
based production, at least for the first generation of deep-sea mining
operations [Dick, 1981]. For if, irrespective of long-run profitability
considerations, first-generation costs are higher than the new equi-
librium price p1 in Figure 1, deep-sea miners will have to bear a self-
induced loss. On the other hand, if first-generation costs are lower
than pj, deep-sea miners will enjoy a gain in producer surplus.
Similarly, the changes in consumer and producer surpluses can be de-
2
termined for cobalt, copper and nickel . Alternatively, Figure 1 can be
interpreted as representing the aggregated supply and demand curves
for all four metals [Wijkman, 1981]. Further, it might also be of inte-
rest to focus on the trade effects of seabed mining for a particular
country [Tilton, 1983]. The results derived above, however, can be
readily carried over to any of the alternative approaches.
It should be noted that most of the land-based producers of manga-
nese are at the same time consumers and that countries active in
seabed mining also play on both sides of the market.
2
Only one point should be borne in mind when analyzing the cobalt
and nickel markets. The transition from monopolistic competition pre-
vailing on both markets to a more competitive Situation implies a re-
duction of monopoly benefits accruing to the dominant land-based
producers. In fact the bulk of producer surplus on the cobalt and
nickel markets arises from monopoly. There is, thus, a qualitative
distinction to be drawn between losses of producer surplus in compe-
titive and in uncompetitive markets.- 4 -
Figure 1 - Hypothetical Demand and Supply Curves on thc World
Manganese Market
qL q0- 5 -
2. Economic Rents and International Common Property Resources
The above analysis showed the simple economics of deep-sea mining
when only direct effects are taken into account. For certain purposes,
though, it could be convenient to discriminate between the producer
and the resource owner. The reason for this is that they each expect a
different kind of income from mining. Mining firms will try to make a
profit on their production, whereas the resource owner will try to cap-
ture a part of the potential economic rent associated with a particular
mining site. While the ownership issue seems straightforward on a
country level, where usually the government is the legal proprietor, in-
ternational common property resources like manganese nodules lying on
the ocean bed beyond national jurisdiction have been declared by the
Convention to constitute the "common heritage of mankind", whatever it
means.
Traditionally, ocean resources have been simultaneously considered to
be res nullius, res communes and res publicae [Clarkson, 1974], i. e.
owned by no one, by everyone and by the nation states. Under such a
regime of open access ocean resources were used on a first-come, first-
served basis. This rule obviously works efficiently as long as the re-
sources are so plentiful that congestion does not occur. With increasing
scarcity, resource management becomes necessary, the optimal degree of
control depending on whether the resource in question is of the renew-
able or non-renewable kind and divisible or not. Contrary to fisheries,
manganese nodules can be efficiently utilized if exclusive, universal and
transferable property rights are assigned to interested firms endowed
with appropriate technology and risk capital, because they could be en-
forced on a relatively low-cost basis . With such a slightly restricted
access, firms holding property rights on resources located beyond na-
tional jurisdiction do not share economic rent with any state, the only
exception being the country of registration which might feel entitled to
2
tax away at least some part of the mineral rent .
An optimal regime to manage seabed mining under a restricted access
also implies further legal-institutional features which are discussed in
Foders [1984]. Here we concentrate only on the ownership aspect of
such a regime.
2
The debate in the literature on whether or not nation states are en-
titled to tax income arising from commercial activities carried out be-
yond national jurisdiction still goes on. On this see Delespaul
[1982].- 6 -
Fearing that only a minor group of DCs would benefit from seabed min-
ing, thereby fundamentally changing the world pattern of minerals pro-
duction and trade, some UNCLOS participants succeeded in incorporat-
ing the creation of an International Seabed Authority with ownership
over the "common heritage of mankind" into the Convention . Whatever
the rationale for these fears and the remedy suggested for them, this
means that if the Convention should pass ratification and, thus, some-
day become effective as international law, deep-sea mining is expected
to generate a direct rent income for the Seabed Authority. This will
probably be the case, to the extent that both the fiscal bürden on the
interested firms and the additional conditions stipulated in the con-
2
tracts do not work as a disincentive for mining operations under the
q
Convention's regime . The Authority's budget will albeit not only in-
clude revenue from firms holding seabed mining contracts but also
funds from other sources, as determined by Article 171 [UN, 1982, a],
Besides covering the administrative expenses of such an organization,
these funds are supposed to be used to compensate developing countries
for potential reductions in export earnings caused by market reactions
to seabed mining [UN, 1982, a, Art 173, § 2 (c)]. Thus, the Seabed
Authority has been devised to redistribute gains and losses resulting
from the recovery of manganese nodules among countries active in sea-
bed mining and land-based producers of the affected metals.
III. The World Distribution of Gains and Losses From Deep-Sea Mining:
Some Estimates
The empirical assessment of changes in producer and consumer sur-
pluses following seabed mining calls for the estimation of long run sup-
"All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a
whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act." [UN, 1982, a, Art.
137, § 2].
The impact of royalties and other payments on the firm's investment
and production behaviour is analyzed in Foders [1984, b], One of
the regulations included in the Convention expected to substantially
obstruct firm participation is the compulsory technology transfer re-
gime. On this see Dick and Gutberiet [1983].
It is, of course, always possible that some countries decide to mine
the ocean bed on the basis of softer terms resulting from bilateral or
multilateral agreements, ignoring the Convention. On institutional
choice in this context see Foders [1984, c].- 7 -
ply and demand curves on the metal markets in question. The available
data base, though, precludes such estimates on a world scale and even
for the most important producer and consumer countries . Alternatively,
changes in production and consumption value can be used as a rough
but nevertheless meaningful indicator of the level and distribution of
gains and losses associated with ocean mining. Estimation of losses in
production value instead of producer surplus has the advantage of ap-
proximating the potential shortfalls in export earnings of LDCs which,
in turn, could be used to discuss the viability of loser compensation by
the Seabed Authority.
In this study changes in production and consumption value are com-
puted on the basis of Simulation results for cobalt, copper, manganese
2
and nickel presented elsewhere . For this purpose, it is assumed that
five private international consortia [UN, 1982, b] have been assigned
fictitious contracts by the Seabed Authority as of January, 1985. Com-
mercial production is hypothesized to begin 1988, i. e. three years la-
ter. Although it can be expected, that these contracts will have a life
of at least 20 - 25 years, Simulation results for years after 1995 have
been considered to be extremely unreliable. The latter follows from the
fact that the econometric modeis used in the simulations do not endo-
genize seabed mining. The beginning of ocean mining will probably ex-
ert some influence on the world pattern of minerals production and
trade, particularly on supply elasticities, and structural Simulation mo-
dels, thus, cannot be expected to adequately catch the füll impacts. On
the other hand, this is the best one can do at this stage, since one
could hardly estimate such structural changes from historical data today
without making heroic assumptions. Therefore, it was convenient to
confine the analysis to the first eight years of metals production from
the ocean bed.
"Econometric studies at best provide a reliable picture of the nature
of these curves and the elasticities around the ränge of prices and
Outputs that have actually occured in the past" [Tilton, 1983,
p. 23].
2 See Foders and Kim [1983], Rafati [1982, a, b,] and Wagenhals
[1983]. The simulated prices and quantities of seabed minerals used
to calculate production and consumption values and their changes are
included in Appendix B.- 8 -
1. The Seabed Authority's Revenue From Seabed Mining Contracts
The financial terms of the contracts to be assigned by the Seabed Au-
thority are included in Article 13 in Annex III to the Convention [UN,
1982, a]. Firms operating under one of these contracts are expected to
pay (a) an application fee of US-$ 500 000,— and (b) an annual fixed
fee of US-$ 1 million or a production Charge, whichever is greater.
Further, the contractor is free to choose between a production Charge
only (= royalty) and a combination of production Charge and a share of
net proceeds. For data reasons, in this study we shall assume that the
five consortia each signed a contract stipulating the payments of royal-
ties only. Moreover, Article 13 sets the royalty at 5 percent of the pro-
duction value in the years 1 to 10 and at 12 percent from the eleventh
year onwards, till the end of the production period.
Based on the amounts of cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel recover-
ed from seabed mining assumed in the said Simulation runs, Table 1
shows the total estimated value of mineral output from the ocean bed,
together with the resulting royalties. Although in some simulations more
than two scenarios were considered, here we just focus on the "low"
and the "high" scenarios . In Table 2 the total revenue of the Seabed
Authority is presented, including the application fees and the annual
fixed fees to be paid from 1985 to 1987, i. e. till the beginning of com-
mercial production in 1988. Thus, in the period under analysis, the Au-
thority's income amounts to about 6 percent of the total value of Output
in the low case and to 5.86 percent in the high case. If output were
restricted to the low case, the revenue per contract would be only 61.3
percent of the one that could be achieved in the high case.
The relevant issues about the Authority's revenue are (a) whether it
has any important impact on the level and distribution of net gains
(losses) from seabed mining and (b) whether it could be used to com-
pensate the losers. Both topics will be discussed in the next sections.
The high scenario is reported (a) to contrast the outcome under the
Convention, i. e. with production ceilings, with a Situation where no
restrictions are imposed and (b) to analyze the sensitivity of the
distributional impact of seabed mining with respect to the level of
seabed production. It is, however, unlikely that such a high case
should materialize under the Convention.Table 1 - Projected Royalty Income of the Seabed Authority From Deep-Sea Mining Contracts
1988 - 1995, (millions of 1981 US-$)
Year
























































































495.4 824.5 311.8 520.3
For 1988 - 1994 (years 4 to 10) the royalty is 5 % of the production value, whereas for
1995 (the eleventh year) it increases to 12 %.
Discount rate: 10 %; base year: 1988.
Source: Own calculations.Table 2 - Projected Total Seabed Authority Revenue From Deep-Sea" Mining Contracts,
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Total revenue
Revenue per contract
Rate: 10 %; base year:
































1988; conunercial production is assumed to begin 1988, three years
fictitious contracts to five international consortia.
o
I
Source: Own calculations.Table 3 - Projected Decrease in Consumption Value in Major Consuraer Countries'
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Source: Own calculations.- 12 -
2. Net Gains From Deep-Sea Mining for Major Producers and Consu-
mers
Before discussing the world distribution of net gains (losses) associated
with seabed mining, it might be useful to take a glance at the level and
distribution of absolute decreases in both consumption value (= gains)
and production value (= losses) for major consumer and producer coun-
tries .
The major consumers of seabed minerals can be identified as Japan, the
2
US, Western Europe and the COMECON-countries. Each of these coun-
tries or regions holds a share between 20 and 30 percent of the total
decrease in consumption value enjoyed by them (Table 3). Although the
overall absolute gain appears to be almost equally distributed, the con-
sumption structure differs from country (region) to country (region).
The US extracts most of her gains from cobalt and the COMECON-coun-
tries from nickel, while Japan and Western Europe equally benefit from
both cobalt and nickel. Manganese accounts for a share between 2.1 and
7.8 percent in the low case and between 3.1 and 9.6 percent in the
high case; the contribution of copper is only marginal.
The predominance of cobalt and nickel on the demand side carries over
to the supply side too. It becomes clear from the decreases in produc-
tion value shown in Table 4 that the lowest value reductions will be
borne by the copper-producing countries (Chile, Peru and the Philip-
3
pines). Zaire, Canada, Australia and the COMECON-countries are the
great losers with a share of 41.2 (28.0), 20.2 (28.3), 10.7 (12.8) and
4
18.7 (21.8) percent, respectively , in the total value decrease suffered
by the major mineral producers included in Table 4. The rest of the
losses will be due to lower values of minerals production in the US (2.0
percent in both scenarios) and in Zambia (3.8 percent in the low case
Decreases in value are computed as difference between the base case
value (without seabed mining) and the values resulting from the low
and high scenarios of seabed mining. These differences are then dis-
counted with a rate of 10 percent to the year 1988 (beginning of
production) and cumulated to calculate their present value in con-
stant 1981 US-$.
2





The shares in parenthesis belong to the high seabed mining scenario.Table 4 - Projected Decrease in Value of Land-Based Production of Major Producer Countries'

























































































































Source: Own calculations.Table 5 - Projected Self-Induced Decrease in Production Value of First-Generation Deep-Sea
Mining Output






































































































Source: Own Calculations.- 15 -
and 2.6 percent in the high case). In sum, the major land-based pro-
ducers of cobalt and nickel show the highest losses.
First-generation recovery of metals from manganese nodules could,
though, not only exert pressure on land-based producers of these me-
tals but also on the seabed miners themselves, to extent that production
costs should result higher than the new equilibrium price p, in Figure
1 during the first eight years, irrespective of long-run profit expecta-
tions. Production of seabed minerals can be attributed to four countries
or regions, considering the shares of the firms registered in these
countries (regions) in the five international consortia assumed to be ac-
tive in deep-sea mining (Appendix A). Table 5 shows the corresponding
distribution of production value losses by country and metal . Accord-
ing to the composition of the said consortia in the year 1982, firms
based in Western Europe will be responsible for half of the production
value generated by seabed mining. Thus, this region will have to bear
the major losses, together with the US, whose share is about 35 per-
cent; Canada and Japan hold a share of only 7.5 percent each. In con-
trast to the losses of the land-based metal producers, which may be at-
tributed to both cobalt and nickel production, the value losses suffered
by seabed miners are due mainly to cobalt production alone. Two con-
clusions can be drawn from this. First, the cobalt market is the worst
hit by deep-sea mining, and second, that future Joint production of me-
tals from the ocean bed might thus be restricted not by developments
on the world nickel market, as is wide]
ditions prevailing on the cobalt market.
2
on the world nickel market, as is widely believed , but rather by con-
How will the distribution of absolute gains and losses influence the dis-
tribution of net gains? Net gains from seabed mining, presented in
Table 7a for the low-cost scenario (costs equal to p1 in Figure 1), were
calculated as decrease in consumption value minus decrease in value of
For the computation of such self-induced losses in the high-cost sce-
nario it is assumed that the costs of seabed mining are constant and
equal to Pn in Figure 1.
2
Production ceilings set in the Convention, for example, are expres-
sed in terms of nickel production [UN, 1982, a, Art. 151, § 4] and
not of cobalt production. Under conditions of Joint production, the
failure to incorporate the cobalt market could have serious conse-
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Source: Own Calculations.Table 7a - Projected World Distribution of Net Gains (+) and Losses (-) from Deep-Sea Mining
Under Open Access and Under the Convention (Cost Scenario I )(millions of 1981 US-$)








































































































-3440.7 -3941.4 -0.3 -0.9
-307.5 -352.5 -0.4 -1.2
-3441.0 -3942.3
-307.9 -353.7
, First-generation costs of seabed mining are assumed to be constant and equal to the new equilibrium price.
Including secondary production.
j Including New Caledonia.
Including payitents to the Seabed Authrority.
Source: Own calculations.Table 7b - Projected World Distribution of Net Gains (+) and Losses (-) from Deep-Sea Mining
Under Open Access and Under the Convention (Cost Scenario II )(millions of 1981 US-$)












































































































-3440.7 -3941.4 -0.3 -0.9
-307.5 -352.5 -0.4 -1.2
-3441.0 -3942.3
-307.9 -353.7
, First-generation costs of seabed mining are assumed to be constant and equal to base case equilibrium price.
Including secondary production.
j Including New Caledonia.
Including payments to the Seabed Authrority.
Source: Cwn calculations.- 19 -
land-based production. Net gains presented in Table 7b correspond to
the high-cost scenario (costs equal to pQ in Figure 1) and include the
decrease in value of seabed production. For the scenario under the
Convention, the payments to the Seabed Authority (Table 6) were also
taken into account. The assumption of relatively low deep^sea mining
costs results in net gains for Japan, the United States and Western
Europe in all output and institutional scenarios studied (Table 7a). The
United States is shown to enjoy the highest share in total net gains in
the low-output case under both institutional settings, whereas the
highest share corresponding to the high-output cases is achieved by
Japan. Differences in net gains due to output level Variation (measured
as a percentage of low-output net gains) amount to 64 % for Japan, 25 %
for Western Europe and 18 % for the United States under the open ac-
cess regime. Payments to the Seabed Authority reduce such differences
for both the United States and Western Europe by almost 3 percentage
points. Moreover, payments under the Convention also depress the level
of net gains by about 2 % for Japan in both output scenarios and by 8
% (low-output case) and 11 % (high-output case) for the United States
and Western Europe.
In contrast, under the high-cost assumption (Table 7b), Japan turns
out to be the only net winner in every scenario, holding a share of
47.4 percent in total net gains estimated for the low seabed mining case
and one of 96.8 percent in the high case, excluding payments to the
Authority. If fees and royalties paid to the Authority are considered,
Japan's share in net gains is 51.7 percent and 100 percent in the low
and high cases, respectively. Western Europe and the US are the other
two net winners, with the exception of the high scenario including pay-
ments to the Seabed Autority, where both countries suffer net losses.
Interestingly, the US presents net losses for manganese and nickel in
all cases and for copper in the high case only, the source of her gains
being cobalt. In contrast, the only net loss registered for Western
Europe is due to the high cobalt scenario.
Canada and Zaire have to bear the heaviest losses in net terms, with
the former country losing on copper and nickel in the low-cost case and
on every metal in the high-cost case, and the latter country losing on
cobalt and copper. Australia (including New Caledonia) also suffers- 20 -
substantial losses from cobalt, manganese and nickel. Minor losers are
South Africa, Zambia and the COMECON-countries.
IV. Redistributing Income From Deep-Sea Mining
The beginning of seabed mining is expected to change the existing in-
ternational pattern of mining activity, inducing a reallocation of capital
and labour away from inefficient onshore mining sites and, thus, a re-
distribution of income arising from this industry. The regime to govern
seabed mining included in the Convention on the Law of the Sea has
been apparently devised to obstruct such potential shifts in income
distribution brought about by, market forces reacting to cheaper mine-
rals supply from the ocean bed. Besides erecting barriers to entry to
ocean mining and allowing for production ceilings, the Convention pro-
vides for compensatory payments to land-based producers "which suffer
serious adverse effects on their export earnings or economies resulting
from a reduction in the price of an affected mineral or in the volume of
exports of that mineral" [UN, 1982, (a), Art. 151, § 10].
On the basis of the empirical results presented in Chapter III, where
the level and distribution of losses in production value incurred by tra-
ditional mineral-exporting countries were analyzed, the next sections
will discuss the desirability and the feasibility of compensatory pay-
ments, drawing on international experience with the IMF's Compensatory
Finance Facility scheme and the EEC's STABEX System.
1. Compensatory Payments to Mineral-Exporting LDCs
The simple microeconomics of Figure 1 clearly show the effects of a
supply shock on prices and quantities of the minerals in question. In
the short run, at least, mineral prices are bound to fall subject to the
relevant elasticities. In the long run, however, adjustments on both
sides of the market could possibly quite well absorb the additional sup-
ply of metals from the ocean bed, assuming seabed mining should in
fact turn out to be competitive, and contribute to a recovery of prices.
Since we are dealing with natural resources, increasing scarcity should,
following the Hotelling-rule, make such an outcome plausible. What does- 21 -
In the short term, lower metal prices could have both a direct demand-
effect and a substitution-effect in favour of cheaper metals. Although
mineral exports should only slowly return to the levels recorded before
the supply shock, lower prices could have the advantage of being more
stable than higher ones, allowing for a stabilization of export earn-
ings. Of course, lower prices usually render those tnining ventures un-
profitable which are run by-firms that fail to improve efficiency and to
hold down costs accordingly. In many cases, mines would have to be
closed, at least until the market offers new profitable opportunities.
The capital and labour released should be efficently used for other mi-
neral projects or for projects in other sectors of the economy, as far as
they are non-specific factors.
The availability of compensatory payments to mineral-exporting LDCs as
stipulated in the Convention would undoubtedly interfere with the pro-
cess of optimal allocation of factors of production in these countries by
smoothing out the impact of lower metal prices and/or lower quantities
exported, independently of who receives the subsidies, the firms them-
selves or the government. Land-based producers are isolated from mar-
ket Signals, and worse still, efficient and inefficient miners are given
equal treatment. In spite of the fact that the most efficient land-based
producers will have to bear the greatest losses from the impact of ocean
minerals, their past Performance indicates that it is not certain a priori
whether or not they can successfully meet the challenge from the sea.
Therefore, compensatory payments are also likely to obstruct internal
adjustment of efficient firms engaged in onshore mining.
To the extent that marketing boards and similar institutions in LDCs al-
ready isolate domestic producers from the world markets, reductions in
export earnings due to deep-sea mining could have macroeconomic ef-
fects in the sense that a country's total foreign exchange revenue could
fall short of the expected level and consequently diminish its import ca-
pacity. Normally, lower export proceeds would induce such institutions
to refrain from less profitable "development projects" originally planned
under the assumption of higher foreign exchange availability. Compen-
satory payments to these countries would obviously create an automati-
cal supply of foreign exchange loans to finance projects, the profitabi-- 22 -
lity and viability of which is unknown to the creditor . Thus, optimal
allocation of financial resources in this context seems to be a matter of
chance, especially considering that neither the past financial record nor
the potential future exports of these countries could influence eligibility
for receiving compensatory payments.
The above arguments against compensatory finance to developing coun-
tries which are exporters of minerals affected by seabed mining are ful-
ly supported by the available evidence on the Performance of similar
schemes offered by the EEC and the IMF to stabilize exports of both
2
mineral and non-mineral commodities from LDCs . Interestingly, the
EEC's compensatory payment System for minerals, Minex, which has so
far already generated transfers to Zambia and Zaire, also includes co-
balt, copper and manganese, i. e. three of the four seabed minerals .
Under this System, Zambia received 55 million Europeari Currency Units
and Zaire 40 million [Kibola, 1984, p. 45]. The financial terms were as
follows: 1 percent interest to be repaid over 40 years with a grace
period of 10 years, at a time when international interest rates were at
record levels (1983). These figures speak for themselves.
2. The Role of the Seabed Authority in International Income Redistri-
bution
At any rate, it should be useful to compute the costs of compensatory
payments for the hypothetical Situation presented in this study. The
4
sum of the value losses incurred by the major mineral-exporting LDCs
In fact these funds could be arbitrarily used by the debtor coun-
tries.
2
See, for example, Cuddy [1979] for a comparative evaluation of the
EEC's Stabex and the IMF's Compensatory Finance Facility schemes.
Experience with Stabex is reported by Kibola [1984]; Faber [1984]
offers a thorough economic analysis of the Stabex System.
3
One could, therefore, argue that these existing schemes could suf-
fice to deal with unstable export earnings, since it should be very
difficult to discriminate between shortfalls due to seabed mining and
those due to other causes.
4
Chile, Peru, Philippines, Zaire and Zambia. The losses computed for
these countries pertain to their production value. Since domestic
consumption is neglectable, it is plausible to assume that total pro-
duction is being exported. For simplicity, inventories are assumed to
be zero.- 23 -
included in Table 4 amount to 3.8 billion US-$ in the low scenario and
to 4.3 billion US-$ in the high scenario; about 91 percent of these los-
ses are borne by Zaire alone. Confronting these figures with the Sea-
bed Authority's revenue in the same period (Table 2) leads to the con-
clusion that the latter would only cover 8.8 percent of the losses in the
low scenario and 12.5 percent in the high case , in the event that füll
compensation should be desired. Thus, at least 85 percent of the funds
needed for compensatory payments would have to come from other sour-
ces, if the financial terms of the seabed mining contracts remain un-
changed. Alternatively, the Seabed Authority could consider a revision
of, say, the royalty charged. In the Situation under study the royalty
would have to amount to 54 percent of production value in the high scen-
ario and to 90 percent in the low case, if the target revenue is to be
set at 5 billion US-$ in order to meet the losses quoted above. Such
royalties would, however, probably render deep-sea mining unprofit-
able. None of the countries included in Table 7 and making net gains
under the terms stipulated in the Convention could do so with increased
royalties. From this can be inferred that the Authority would be obliged
to receive loans from other international organizations to fully eompen-
sate the losers, i. e. the Authority would have to be run virtually like
an international financial institution, very much like the IMF.
Compensatory finance schemes for losers from deep-sea mining are not
only inefficient, too costly and associated with undesirable distributive
effects, but also uneconomic on other grounds. The market potentially
worst hit by seabed mining is the cobalt market; about 90 percent of
the losses due to ocean mining suffered by LDCs are incurred by Zaire,
the dominant cobalt producer. Thus, compensatory payments to Zaire
could turn out to protect or subsidize the monopoly benefit enjoyed by
the price setter on this uncompetitive market. Could it be reasonable to
subsidize monopolies with royalty revenues and/or loans from an Autho-
rity designed to manage the "common heritage of mankind"?
The administrative costs of operating the Authority are not included
in these figures.- 24 -
V. Conclusions
This paper is an attempt to quantitatively and qualitatively assess di-
rect short-run income effects of ocean mining under the assumption that
manganese nodules are recovered under the regime included in the Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea. Subject to the limitations of the analy-
sis, widely held beliefs concerning the distributional impact of deep-sea
mining have been shown to be entirely groundless.
First, it can not be maintained that the LDCs are going to be the big
losers. There will be, though, also a few LDCs among the losers. Cana-
da and Zaire have been identified as the land-based producers who will
have to suffer the highest reductions in production values. The great
majority of the losers are industrialized countries.
Second, Japan, the United States and Wester Europe will be able to en-
joy net gains of seabed mining over the different scenarios studied, if
first-generation costs of seabed mining are in line with lower metal
prices prevailing after the supply shock.
Third, the fees and royalties to be paid to the Seabed Authority will
not be neutral; they can significantly influence the pattern of gains and
losses.
Fourth, compensatory payments to LDCs bearing losses from seabed
mining result in an inefficient allocation of resources. This is suggested
by available international evidence on the IMF's and the EEC's compen-
satory finance schemes.
Fifth, under the financial terms stipulated in the Convention, the po-
tential revenue of the Seabed Authority could at most be used to fi-
nance about 12 percent of the losses incurred by LDCs. The rest would
have to be provided through higher royalties and/or loans from other
institutions. Higher royalties could, however, render ocean mining un-
profitable, and loans could be too costly.
Sixth, 90 percent of LDCs' losses from seabed mining will be suffered
by Zaire, the dominant cobalt producer and price setter on the world- 25 -
market. Any kind of compensation payments to this country would sub-
sidize the monopoly benefits enjoyed by Zaire with funds belonging to
the international Community.
Finally, one could turn around the main argument set out in this paper,
and ask what would happen, if seabed mining does not occur at all in
spite of the ratification ofthe Convention by the required number of
countries, due either to zero production ceilings set by the Authority
or to general abstention. In this case, the estimated losses turn out to
be gains in the sense of "saved" losses and, similarly, the estimated
gains could be interpreted as losses in the sense of foregone gains.
The former would accrue to the land-based producers and the latter
would be suffered by the major consumer countries. Because such an
outcome could be directly associated with protection of land-based mine-
ral producers by barriers to entry, production ceilings and other ob-
stacles to a profitable seabed mining stipulated in the Convention, the
said gains would essentially be monopoly benefits from cartelization
backed by international law.
On the other hand, such a hypothetical pattern of income effects could
be successfully impeded if countries interested in manganese nodules
yet opposing the Convention were to recover them ignoring the Conven-
tion. Then the expected international distribution of gains and losses
would again be very much like the one presented in this paper for the
scenario under open access.- 26 -
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Appendix A
Country of Origin and Shares of Firms Participating in International
Seabed-Mining Consortia , 1982































Excluding the Japanese Consortium DOMA as well as state-owned en-
terprises from China, India and the USSR.
Belgium, France, Germany (F. R. of), Italy, Netherlands, United
Kingdom.
Source: UN [b, 1982].Appendix B











































































































































































case without seabed mining. Quantities of minerals produced








































































































































































































































































































































Imports of Manganese Ore for
COMECON-countries
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Rafati [1982, a].